We examine the synchronisation of the European Union (EU) financial markets before and during the 2007 global financial crisis. We use an Asymmetric Dynamic Conditional Correlation (ADCC)-GARCH framework to control for the time-varying correlations and a Markov-Switching model to identify regime changes. Our sample considers 27 EU nations for the period 2000-2011. For each nation we formulate several characteristics of the crisis such as, synchronicity, duration and intensity measures. We find that the more recent EU members had a lagged entry to the crisis regime, were less adversely affected, show higher correlation between their stock markets and have their credit scores being revised more frequently relative to established EU members. We also find that higher levels of sovereign debt and lower levels of industrialisation positively impact crisis duration and intensity. Our results refute the notion of uniform integration of EU financial markets as evident from the highly non-synchronised observed crisis experience among the EU members. As such, one-size fits all policies are likely to be ineffective.
Introduction
In the last two decades global financial markets have become highly integrated as evident by the intensity and coverage of the recent global financial crisis that originated in the US and resonated across the globe. European financial markets were amongst the hardest hit, partially due to their high interconnection with the US market, but also due to the increased integration within the European Union (EU).
The increased integration, efficiency and functionality of the financial system in the European Union ranks high within the EU economic agendas.
2 Indeed, these are seen as essential elements for the effective implementation of European Central Bank (ECB) economic policies (ECB, 2010) . Till the recent past, high economic and financial integration have always been associated with prosperity and economic wellbeing. But is financial integration always desirable? On one hand it facilitates the functioning of a -Single Market‖, and acts as a medium via which financial instability may spread, manifested by excessive co-movements among asset prices which exceed those set by fundamentals. However, as weak economic fundamentals in one nation are brought into the spotlight by a financial crisis, investors may fear that other nations have similar traits; thus spreading financial contagion (Masson 1999) . For example, towards the end of 2009, when problems in Greece were traced to severe fiscal/debt issues, the fear grew of similar scenarios within Italy and Portugal. Increased financial integration, liquid financial markets and new financial products (e.g., credit default swaps), create transmission channels that allow contagion to spread more rapidly (Baele, 2005; Calvo, 1998) . Although financial crises invite the search for evidence of financial contagion, it is more pertinent to question whether contagion is synchronised across the EU countries. Synchronisation would uphold the concept of the Single Market, whilst the idea of a -twospeed EU‖ would receive support if contagion were not synchronised.
In two consecutive phases between 2004 and 2007 the number of EU members 3 increased from 15 to 27.
Although many of the 12 New Member States (hereafter NMS) display common economic features, others are disparate, either between themselves or compared to earlier EU members. For instance, the per capita GDP of Cyprus is twice that of Poland, while stock markets in the former satellite states of the Soviet Union, i.e., the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) nations, have very small market capitalisation. The popular representation of the hard-working North versus the lazy-South has also received much attention and highlights the lack of uniformity within the EU (Charlemagne, 2010) . Despite such differences, some of the NMS committed themselves to the further step of integration by joining the Eurozone.
In recognising the varying degree of integration across EU nations, this paper examines the experience of a correlated-information channel type of financial contagion in light of the global financial crisis for the EU equity markets. The encompassing term experience refers to the existence, the synchronisation, the duration and the intensity of the financial contagion effects across the EU members.
For this purpose, we adopt an Asymmetric Dynamic Conditional Correlation (ADCC)-Markov Switching (MS)-GARCH model, which captures dynamic correlations and identifies regime change. The ADCC-GARCH allows the disentangling of negative and positive shocks in the volatility and/or correlation process (Gjika and Horváth, 2013) , which makes an ideal candidate in the context of our study. The
Our main findings can be summarised as follows. In the broadest terms, the former EU members are affected earlier than the NMS. Where Core EU members are generally hit by the financial crisis around late July 2007, the effects reach the NMS more than a year later. The duration of the crisis has been more prolonged for the former EU members and the PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain) in particular, while for the NMS the duration has been significantly lower. Crisis intensity measures finds that the Core EU has been most adversely affected by the crisis. Overall, integration in financial markets seems to have been affected by the global financial crisis, while the results presented here suggest that differences between the EU nation groups may have widened.
This section is the first of six. Section 2 provides a brief outline of the literature. Sections 3 and 4 outline the data and the methodology. Findings are provided in section 5 which is followed by final conclusions.
Literature Review

From Integration to Contagion
Financial integration in the EU entered a new era in the years preceding the introduction of the single currency 5 with many studies documenting evidence of increased co-movements in national stock markets (Hardouvelis et al., 2006; Baele and Inghelbrecht, 2010; Asgharian and Nossman, 2011 among others) . In the early 21 st century, stock markets in the EU members featured low volatility, high correlation, and reduced portfolio diversification benefits (Kim et al., 2005; Baele and Inghelbrecht, 2009; Savva, 2009; Bekaert et al., 2013) .
Despite the benefits from financial integration during times of tranquillity, it brings detrimental effects during times of economic and/or financial instability. Homogeneous financial integration would propagate shocks more easily across the EU giving rise to increased correlations between stock markets in what has been generally termed as financial contagion (King and Wadhwani, 1990; Lee and Kim, 1993; Calvo et al., 1996; Baig and Goldfajn, 1998) . However, the asymmetric response of EU nations to external shocks has been indicative of the degree of heterogeneity in EU financial integration (Clayes and Vasicek, 2014) . In that context, even if a crisis has been correctly anticipated, the presence, duration and intensity of financial contagion in every nation cannot be predicted. As such, it may be plausibly argued that from the two situations, the former may be preferable from certain viewpoints (e.g., a regulator's) as the same -treatment‖ should be applied in all nations. Where some nations have been heavily exposed to financial contagion while others have weathered the storm may be trickier as it could give rise to further instability, dichotomy of suggested approaches at a policy-making level and inevitably discussions about a -two-speed Europe‖ (Gębka and Karoglou, 2013) . Ultimately, and as argued in Yang et al., (2003) and Bley (2009) , financial integration differentials across time and EU-wide, may undermine the pursuit of the Single Market's ultimate goal.
The CEE group has occupied much of the literature testing for financial contagion over different phases of its integration with the EU/Eurozone. Early studies with a focus in the mid-90s conclude that integration levels amongst CEE stock markets and with the rest of the EU are low; see for example Kasch-Haroutounian and Price (2001) and Scheicher (2001) . CEE stock markets have shown no signs nor symptoms of financial contagion (contrary to the EU-15) in light of earlier economic crises (i.e. the Mexican crisis of 1994, the East Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian collapse of 1998, the Brazilian devaluation of 1999 and the dot.com bubble of 2000), which has been attributed to their low degree of financial integration (Serwa and Bohl 2005; Gelos and Sahay, 2001) . Following accession talks, the introduction of the single currency, financial openness and increased interest of foreign investors, integration in the CEE group increases and stock-market co-movements became more pronounced (Wang and Moore, 2008; Savva and Aslanidis, 2010; Syllignakis and Kouretas, 2011) . CEE stock and bond markets exhibited financial contagion following the global financial crisis, as evidenced in the study of Chmielewska (2010).
Financial Contagion: Transmission Channels and Identification
Definitions of contagion may vary according to the transmission channel under study. Examples of transmission channels include the liquidity, the wealth effect, the risk-premium and the correlatedinformation. The liquidity channel is typically relevant to foreign financial institutions restricting liquidity in the host country as they adjust their positions in an attempt to meet with regulatory requirements and/or mitigate anticipated/realized losses in their home country (Acharya and Pedersen, 2005) . Predatory trading can exacerbate the destabilizing effect of the liquidity channel (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009) . Contagion may be aggravated by wealth effect channels as traders with limited capacity for bearing risks liquidate their positions in the markets they operate (Kyle and Xiong, 2001) . Such traders may rely on global variance risk premium, a proxy for economic uncertainty that can provide increased accuracy for the individual country return/risk predictability (Bollerslev et al., 2014) . For a detailed exposition of the contagion transmission channels we direct you to Pericoli and Sbracia, (2003) . Implementation problems can arise due to the complex nature of some of these channels as argued in M A N U S C R I P T et al., (2013) . The focus of this study is the correlated information channel, which posits that a shock in a financial market works as a signal, potentially affecting other financial markets.
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
From an identification viewpoint, contagion refers to the spread of financial disturbances among countries. Such disturbances can be represented as crisis probabilities; see for example Eichengreen et al., (1999) where contagion is defined as a rise in the probability that a nation experiences a crisis given that a crisis exists in another nation. A complementary view emphasized by Bekaert et al., (2005) is that contagion is identified by correlations beyond those that may be explained by economic fundamentals. Here, the challenge is to determine the fundamental factors, and whether to use observable variables or latent variables estimated by complex econometric techniques such as factor analysis. 6 Forbes (2001) suggests yet another definition: an increase in cross-market linkages following an economic shock in one nation. This -shift-contagion‖ (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002) highlights three main issues: international diversification; effectiveness of international institutions and bail-out funds; and propagation mechanisms (Billio and Caporin 2005) . An advantage of the -shift-contagion‖ definition is that it makes use of correlation values (therefore integrates nicely with the correlated information channel) that are both intuitively straightforward to interpret and integrate well within financial integration framework (Bekaert et al., 2009 ).
In the -shift-contagion‖ framework, testing for financial contagion typically amounts to tests of statistical significance between normal periods and crisis periods. In this manner, King and Wadhwani (1990) and Lee and Kim (1993) verify contagion across major stock markets following the 1987 US stock market crash. 7 This approach has also been applied in the wake of the 1994 Mexican crisis for stock and bond markets (Calvo et al. 1996) . In similar fashion, Baig and Goldfajn (1999) investigate the contagion effects of the 1997 East Asian crisis on stock and bond markets, currency exchange values and interest rates.
A drawback of the -shift-contagion‖ methodology relates to the heteroskedasticity induced bias on financial contagion tests (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002) . However, the innovation of multivariate GARCH models 8 that produce time-varying correlation coefficients has surpassed these problems and re-energised interest in financial contagion studies (Engle 2002; Tse and Tsui, 2002) . Much of this research is focused on exchange rates (Khalid and Rajaguru, 2005) , bond markets (Coudert and Gex, 2010) and stock markets (Chiang et al., 2007) . From their investigation of nine East Asian exchanges (1990 -2003) using a DCC-GARCH framework the latter authors find evidence of contagion after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Cho and Parhizgari (2008) obtain similar findings from a larger sample of 14 nations. Yiu et al., (2010) and Naoui et al., (2010) find evidence of contagion between the US and East Asia for the 1997 East Asian, the 2000 dot.com and the 2007 financial crises. Kenourgios et al., (2011) verifies financial contagion from the crisis country to a set of emerging and developed countries for the 1997 East Asian 6 For financial contagion to be verified through this technique there should be statistically significant evidence of correlation in the model's residuals. However, the identification of financial contagion may be inversely related to the models' performance, which could explain why Baele and Inghelbrecht (2010) fail to find contagion with their optimal model, but document contagion evidence once a more restricted model is used. 7 On the October 19 th 1987 the Dow Jones fell 22.6%, the largest one day fall to date. 8 Prior to the introduction of Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) models, correlations were either assumed to be timeinvariant or their estimation would suffer from the ‗dimensionality curse', as witnessed by VEC and BEKK models, as described in Engle and Kroner (1995) . As a consequence, most empirical work has been either: a) restricted to a limited number of nations, or b) assumed time-invariant correlations so that estimation parameters are kept low. Several studies have looked at contagion across a limited number of nations to avoid the aforementioned econometric problems. For instance, Hamao et al. (1990) test for contagion between Japan, the UK and the US in the wake of the 1987 US stock market crash, while Edwards and Susmel (2003) focus on how the Mexican devaluation of 1994 was manifested upon the bond markets of Argentina and Chile. crisis, the 1998 Russian crisis, the 2000 dot.com and the two Brazilian crises in 1997-98 and 2002. The global financial crisis has been a focal point with several studies investigating contagion in a crosscountry (Suh, 2015; Ludwig, 2014; Dimitriou et al., 2013; Kalbaska and Gatkowski, 2012) , a crossindustry (Kenourgios and Dimitriou, 2015) or a combined basis (Bekaert et al., 2014) 9 We are aware of the existence of other techniques to estimate contagion. The DCC approach is similar and compares rather well to other techniques available in the literature. Moreover, the DCC approach is easy to implement and interpret. 10 Complete coverage for some of the New Member States is not available prior to this date. 11 Several studies are mindful of an induced bias when stock markets operate during different trading hours (Kahya, 1997; Burns et al., 1998; Martens and Poon, 2001 ). This is particularly relevant when dealing with countries across a large variety of time zones (e.g., UK, US, Japan) and/or countries operating a different business week (for example, the business week in the Arab Gulf countries is Sunday to Thursday). Jondeau and Rockinger (2006) lag US returns to accommodate the different trading hours of US and European markets. Similarly, Kenourgios et al. (2014) use two-day moving averages. However, this becomes of little concern as all EU stock markets operate within a maximum of a two-hour difference. To accommodate for time differences, we use of daily closing prices as suggested in Gębka and Karoglou (2013) . 12 We apply the Wald-Wolfowitz test (also known as runs test), first used by Fama (1965) to test the weak form of the efficient market hypothesis. The null hypothesis states that each element in a -run‖ is independent and identically distributed. Failure to reject the null provides support for the efficient market hypothesis.
of financial intermediation in the majority of the NMS. Their stock markets were developed with their transition from communism in the early 1990s. In terms of the macroeconomic environment, there are signs of recovery from the crisis towards the end of our sample period, with Luxembourg recording positive annual GDP growth (3.52%). By contrast, signs indicative of poor financial conditions and ongoing problems are still evident in Finland (-8.20% ). The PIIGS show greater similarity with the NMS in certain respects. For example, stock market capitalisation is lower in the PIIGS compared to the Core-EU and the Scandinavian groups, while Italy and Portugal were the only nations of the group to record a positive GDP growth in 2010.
[ Table 2 here] Table 3 provides stock market descriptive statistics for the EU-27 nations for the sample period. In general, returns are higher for the NMS compared to the EU-15. The PIIGS group had the worst performance, with an average return of -0.025%, with the figure for Greece being the lowest at -0.052% and Spain the highest at -0.003%. Similarly, the Core EU group had an average daily return of -0.002%, with the highest and lowest occurring in Germany (0.043%) and the Netherlands (-0.029%) respectively. By contrast, the groups constituting the NMS enjoyed positive average returns ranging from 0.016% (RAMS II) to 0.043% (Baltics). The annualized volatility and value-at-risk (VaR) 13 measures reflect the turbulent economic environment. For instance, VaR classifies the financial market of Germany (Luxembourg) as being the least (most) risky. Note that, at the outbreak of the financial crisis, the Luxembourg stock market index lost about 85% of its value, possibly a reaction to the investment reshuffling of a number of money market funds domiciled in the nation due to the favourable tax and legal environment (KPMG, 2011; PwC, 2008) .
[ Table 3 here]
Methodology
This section outlines the estimation techniques adopted in this study. We consider an asymmetric dynamic conditional correlations (ADCC) GARCH model, similar to Gjika and Horváth (2013) . This model accounts for both the time varying nature and asymmetry of the cross-movement of volatilities. To identify regime changes and crisis transition dates we use a Markov-switching framework, following Mandilaras and Bird (2010) . This framework is incorporated within the ADCC-GARCH estimation, similar to Marcucci (2005).
14 Therefore our general model may be termed as an ADCC-MS-GARCH. We construct measures of crisis synchronicity, duration and intensity. Cerda (2009) provides several measures of crisis duration, albeit in a different context, which are notionally aligned to those we report. Although there has been discussion on the extent of crisis synchronicity and intensity -see for example Claeys and Vasicek, (2014); Gębka and Karoglou, (2013) -ours is the first attempt to quantify these concepts in a financial contagion framework. We provide extensive analysis of the conditional correlation measures from two viewpoints; an EU-wide and an intra-EU. These measures enable us to assess the impact of the 13 Value at Risk (VaR) estimates the worst 1-day ahead loss at a given confidence level. VaR is calculated as the 5 th percentile of the stock market returns, thus avoiding any assumptions pertaining to the normality of the return distribution. 14 Univariate models of the DCC-GARCH are essentially Markov-Switching GARCH models. These generally suffer from the -path dependency‖ problem. One way to deal with this issue is for their estimation to be done through certain modifications on the likelihood function (see for example Gray, 1996; Glynn and Haas, 2004 and Klaassen, 2002) . Other methods include the use of GMM methods (Francq and Zakoian, 2008) , Bayesian (Bauwens et al., 2010; 2014) or -quasi‖-Bayesian techniques (Augustyniak, 2014) . financial crisis on the dynamics of co-movements between EU stock markets, and whether these are due to the respective market's integration with the rest of the EU, or due to regional, intra-EU integration.
Dynamic Conditional Correlation
Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC)-GARCH models were introduced separately by Engle (2002) and Tse and Tsui (2002) , with the two approaches differing in the parameterisation of the conditional correlation matrix. Subsequent extensions of DCC-GARCH models are of two kinds. The first is in the volatility modelling phase where the univariate GARCH has been superseded by models that account for asymmetries (EGARCH), long-memory (FIGARCH) and regime changes (MS-GARCH). The second relates to the DCC estimator itself, with the corrected DCC-GARCH model proposed by Aielli (2013) providing an alternative, asymptotically unbiased, estimator.
15 Further extensions include the asymmetric DCC (ADCC) model, which allows for asymmetric effects to impact the conditional correlations (Cappiello et al., 2006) .
In general, the estimation of an ADCC-GARCH type of model consists of three phases (Engle, 2002) . In the first phase, univariate GARCH models are fitted to the asset returns. In the second phase, the unconditional correlation and covariance matrices of both standardised returns and negative standardised returns are estimated. The third phase consists of a quasi-maximum likelihood estimation procedure for the conditional correlation dynamics.
To outline the framework consider a vector of asset returns in which, is normally distributed with mean zero and variance
Where is the information set at time , and the variance process is characterised by a GARCH process.
For the matrix of asset returns the time-varying covariance matrix is defined as a product of time-varying standard deviations and time-varying correlations as follows: (3) where (4) To incorporate asymmetries in the correlation dynamics Cappiello et al., (2006) modify the conditional correlation equation of Engle (2002) to the one given below: (5) where takes the value 1 when , zero otherwise, representing therefore bad news. For the matrix to be positive definite, a set of restrictions is imposed. These restrictions require that: i)
; ii) ; iii) ; iv) and maximum eigenvalue is estimated from the data. A rescaling of Q t ensures that the correlation matrix is well-defined with unitary values along the main diagonal and with each off-diagonal element ranging in absolute value between zero and one (Silvennoinen and Teräsvirta 2008) . The formula for the rescaling of correlations is: (6) where is the identity matrix and denotes the Hadamard product.
For the multivariate part of our setting (the univariate is described in the next section), we adopt an ADCC (1, 1, 1), following Gjika and Horváth (2013) among others. This is given by:
Regime Change and Markov-Switching Models
Common to financial contagion studies adopting a DCC-GARCH framework, is the assumption of an exogenous crisis date. Although this may be plausible for narrow studies, it may be quite restrictive in a multi-nation EU. Several studies have suggested alternative techniques to ameliorate this problem. For example, Olbrys and Majewska (2014) divide market states into -up‖ and -down‖ markets in an attempt to assess the timing of crisis periods for the CEE stock markets. Dividing the volatility series according to the timing of structural breaks prior to testing for financial contagion is followed in Blatt et al., (2014) .
Markov-switching models, introduced by Hamilton (1994) , permit the endogenous estimation of crisis dates, while determining the prevalence of one of two regimes 16 ; a tranquil, relatively stable regime of the economy and a turbulent one that intuitively corresponds to a crisis regime. Mandilaras and Bird (2010) use a Markov-switching in a VAR setting to detect contagion effects in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) for 9 countries over the period 1978 -1993 . Baele (2005 find that volatility spillovers to 13 European stock markets -from within the EU and the USA over the period 1980-2001 -have been intensified during the crisis regimes, which are identified via a Markov-switching model.
A Markov-Switching set-up allows transition probabilities to be estimated, from one state of the economy to another. 17 Markov-Switching models rely on the data to identify the timing of the shift. 18 Typically a latent state variable is used to denote which of the states the economy is in period with . With a typical Markov-switching model for a crisis and a calm regime, regime specific means and volatilities may be written as: (8) with the regime transition probabilities are given as: (9) In our case we adopt the Markov-Switching GARCH (1,1) as our univariate model:
The Markov-Switching GARCH (1,1) model outlined above is the first phase of the multivariate ADCC-GARCH model we utilise and allows for all parameters to depend on the (latent) state of the economy. 
Synchronization, Duration and Intensity Measures
A way to compare the financial crisis experience within the EU countries is to look at crisis synchronisation, duration and intensity measures. To assess the synchronisation of the financial crisis, we compare the estimated crisis transition dates for each individual EU nation with a benchmark date. As benchmark, we utilise the 1/8/2007 which corresponds to the onset of the US sub-prime crisis (Hwang et al., 2010; BIS, 2009). 20 Synchronization of the onset of the crisis is expressed in days and is given as: (12) where denotes the nation, denotes the crisis transition date for each nation and corresponds to the crisis benchmark date. Positive (negative) values indicate a lag (lead) in the transition, relative to the benchmark date for the particular country.
The duration of crisis is measured as the time that a nation has spent within the crisis regime, as identified by the Markov-switching model. It is expressed in days and as a percentage and given as: 18 Strictly speaking, a Markov-switching model employs a state variable which is governed by a first-order Markov chain; thus leaving no room for explanatory variables. The more generic time-varying transition probability models may include explanatory variables to determine the regime of the economy at the cost, however, of greater complication (Filardo, 1994). 19 It is also possible to allow for different regimes in the conditional correlation process (i.e., the ADCC phase), see for example Pelletier (2006) and Cappiello et al., (2006) for approaches with Markov switching regimes and exogenously defined structural breaks respectively. 20 Changing the benchmark date to the collapse of the Lehman brothers (15/9/08), which corresponds to the end of the 1 st phase of the global financial crisis (BIS, 2009) does not challenge our qualitative findings.
where denotes the crisis regime.
Intensity of financial crisis is defined as the logarithmic change in the average volatility level between the crisis and calm regimes in the period following the crisis transition date for each nation. Intensity is expressed as a percentage where a higher (lower) value denotes a more (less) pronounced impact of the financial crisis for the particular nation. Intensity is expressed as a percentage and is given as: (15) where denotes the conditional volatility.
Financial Contagion Measures
Estimates obtained from the ADCC-MS-GARCH model are used to assess the financial contagion in the EU. We construct two correlation indicators that capture EU-wide and intra-EU integration. The EU-wide measure is calculated as the average of the conditional correlation coefficients between a respective nation and all other nations in the sample. For the intra-EU measure, each nation group is considered in isolation; therefore only conditional correlation coefficients among nations in their respective group are considered. The two conditional measures are each given as:
where is the estimated conditional correlation coefficient from the ADCC model, is the crosssectional dimension, denotes the nations in each of the nation groups. Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients, standard errors, goodness-of-fit statistics and transition probabilities for the univariate MS-GARCH models for all the EU-27 nations of the sample. Estimated coefficients are highly significant. 21 The estimated coefficients obtained under the two regimes (calm / crisis) reveal varying volatility dynamics. Overall the non-linear framework provides a good approximation of volatility, as evidenced by the linearity test. Table 5 presents the estimated coefficients of the ADCC model, which are statistically significant. The significantly positive estimate of the asymmetric term, the information criteria and a likelihood ratio test suggest that the ADCC has a slightly better fit than the standard DCC, as it captures asymmetric effects in the conditional correlations.
Results and Discussion
22
[ Table 4 around here]
[ Table 5 around here]
Panel A in Figure 1 shows the evolution of stock price indices for France and the Czech Republic, which we use as illustrative cases for the EU-15 and the NMS nation groups respectively. 23 In the early 2000's, the French stock market experienced a steep downward trend following the burst of the dot.com bubble. Thereafter, an upward trend is evident until the global financial crisis, after which the stock market has fallen sharply. A recovery phase is evident post 2009 but the index remains below pre-crisis levels. The stock market in the Czech Republic shows similar patterns with the exception of the downward trend that followed the dot.com crisis. Panel B, displays the calm / crisis regimes identified by the MarkovSwitching model for the volatility in the two nations' stock market indices. The shaded areas represent periods of turmoil with marked differences in their timing and duration, constituting evidence in favour of varying crisis profiles. Figure 2 shows the crisis transition date for all EU-27 nations. The figure clearly shows a wide disparity in the transition dates, which spread over 623 days, across the different nations.
[ Figure 1 and 2 here] Table 6 reports the crisis experience indicators for every nation and nation group in the sample. Specifically, column II reports the crisis transition dates estimated from the Markov-switching models. Columns III -VI report the calculated measures of crisis synchronization, duration and intensity. Columns VII -VIII relate to sovereign credit rating score revisions, showing the date immediately pre and post the crisis transition date. 24 Columns IX -X show the lead/lag between the credit score change and the crisis transition dates.
Synchronization, Duration and Intensity of the Crisis
[ Table 6 here]
A. Synchronisation 21 As a robustness check we implement a MS-EGARCH(1,1) which accounts for asymmetries in the volatility process. The results (which are not reported) bring no definite improvement over the more parsimonious MS-GARCH(1,1). Hence, for consistency purposes, we proceed with the MS-GARCH(1,1) specification for all nations. 22 As a robustness check, we have cross-checked the crisis transition dates from the Markov Switching framework with those provided by a Zivot-Andrews test (1998) on the conditional volatility of the equity indices. The results show that the dates provided by the two approaches are closely aligned. 23 Owing to space limitations we only report two illustrative graphs for two countries, one from the EU-15 and one from the NMS groups. Graphs for all nations are available upon request. 24 Credit rating scores are obtained from Fitch ratings. The majority of the updates relate to downgrades or to negative switches in the outlook.
Our results refute the notion that all nations experienced a synchronised transition into a crisis regime. One interpretation is that some EU countries were affected with a significant delay by the global financial crisis (GFC). A second interpretation is that, although these countries were directly unaffected by the GFC, they were hit when the effects of the direct impact spread to their economic sectors. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS, 2009) and the Federal Reserve Board of St. Louis (2009) have provided official timelines that place the GFC in four phases. 25 The vast majority of the estimated crisis transition dates fall into the first period. Therefore, we believe that the first interpretation receives empirical support from our data.
The EU-15 nations, the most synchronised group, enter the crisis regime with an average lag of 8 days relative to the crisis transition date benchmark. 26 Conversely, the NMS lags by 165 days and features a wider dispersion between group members. The latter, may relate to their belated entry to the EU and their lower degree of integration. For example, the RAMS I and II groups show a difference of around 107 days in their synchronization of transition to the crisis regime. The non-synchronized transition among Core EU nations is best illustrated by Germany and Luxembourg cases. Relative to the Core EU group average, Germany's entry to the crisis regime lags by 97 days whereas Luxembourg's leads by 153 days. The different orientation of the two economies, with Luxembourg primarily focused on the financial sector, while industry accounts for a large proportion of Germany's GDP may be driving these results. The low stock market activity could be an important factor for the non-synchronisation among the NMS; thereby causing the transmission of shocks to take longer. The cases of Poland (lags by 5 days) and Latvia (lags by 412 days) could further highlight this point as the former's economy is the largest of all NMS, while Latvia is one of the smallest.
B. Duration and Intensity
The duration measures further illustrate the differential crisis experiences of the EU-27 nation groups, with the EU-15 staying for an average of 910 days (92.07%) in crisis regime, as opposed to the 608 days (85.43%) for the NMS, which corresponds to a significantly prolonged crisis duration. The intensity measure also confirms that the severity of the financial crisis has been stronger in the EU-15 than the NMS, as evident from the higher average intensity values (67.10% vs 57.76%) respectively. These findings may be attributed to the increased financial integration of the EU-15 compared to past crises, particularly in respect of the Eurozone, which allows for faster propagation of economic and financial shocks. Nevertheless, the finding provides prima facie evidence of a -two-speed EU‖ with heterogeneous levels of financial integration, which calls for enhanced policies that cater for the distinctive features of the EU nations in periods of crisis. The Scandinavian group weathers the crisis better than both the Core EU and the PIIGS as evident by the lower intensity values. The severity of the crisis in the PIIGS group Baur (2012) and Kenourgios (2014) among others. The four phases of the GFC do not cover the ongoing European sovereign debt crisis. 26 It would be interesting to compare whether this time lag increased/decreased compared to previous crises, however most of the research is not directly comparable for several reasons. Not all crises are directly comparable as they could be regional specific (i.e., 1997 East Asian) or not directly linked to economic/financial characteristics (i.e., 9/11 terrorist attacks). Furthermore, many studies look at spillover effects following a crisis, usually around financially developed countries (see for example, King and Wadwani, 1990) .
may be attributed to investors penalising markets with poor macroeconomic fundamentals, policies and institutions (Bekaert et al., 2014) . The crisis duration and intensity for Greece is interesting insofar as the country records the highest duration (97.43%) and lowest intensity (60.03%) value among the PIIGS group. In Greece the global financial crisis brought to surface chronic debt, fiscal and structural problems. However, unlike Ireland where the financial and banking sectors were hit, in Greece these sectors were relatively unaffected owing in part to the low exposure to securitisation products. Furthermore, the Greek stock market has lower capitalisation than the EU average, and is less interconnected even within the PIIGS group (see also section C) with limited presence of institutional investors. The high exposure of Austria and Belgium to the NMS, as identified in Árvai et al., (2009) , may be a reason for their relatively high crisis intensity score within the Core EU group.
The RAMS II group has weathered the crisis better than the RAMS I group, as evidenced from the lower intensity values. However, the duration of the crisis shows no significant differences between the two groups, albeit there are a few exceptions of nations residing longer in the crisis regime. Cyprus, for example, records the highest crisis duration among the NMS. There are many economic reasons that could explain differentiated responses to the crisis at the nation group level. Nations in the RAMS I group are in a better economic position relatively to those of the RAMS II with respect to the size of the economy (GDP figures are $88.27bil vs $25.03bil respectively) and living standards (around $2,500 difference in GDP per capita). The delayed start (i.e., by approximately 3 years) of the EU accession talks of the RAMS II group could also be a contributing factor.
C. Unified Crisis Performance
The synchronisation, duration and intensity measures reflect different facets of a nation's unified crisis performance (UCP). As such the information they contain, if combined, can provide a systematic ranking about how EU-27 nations fared during the crisis. To achieve this we consider a principal component analysis in two phases. In the first phase we define a single principal component , scaled between zero and one, where higher values indicate nations that fared worse during the crisis. In the second phase and in a similar manner, two principal components are retained.
[Figures 3 and 4 here]
Figure 3 ranks the EU-27 nations ranking according to the indicator. At the extreme ends are Luxembourg and Malta, with the former being the worst affected by the global financial crisis. The figure also marks a clear separation between the EU-15 and the NMS groups with the former in the leftmost part of the graph. Figure 4 illustrates the association of the nations in terms of the indicators. Of interest are the Core EU and the PIIGS groups that appear clustered together (top-right), illustrating that the crisis hit them in a similar manner. The lower association of Greece relatively to the other PIIGS, which was highlighted previously, is here more evident. The NMS are high variable with regards to the UCP as evident by their random scatter. Other notable patterns are the intense degree of crisis exposure in the RAMS I compared to the RAMS II group. 27 The first principal component accounts for 51.66% of the total variance, while with a second the total variance explained reaches 89.35%. For the case of the two principal components we apply an orthogonal varimax rotation that facilitates the interpretation of the components. The first component explains synchronisation/intensity of the crisis, while the second component captures the crisis duration. Principal component analysis has been advocated in Bekaert et al. (2014) among others.
D. Credit Rating Scores
Do changes in credit rating scores match the crisis transition dates of the different nations? Table 6 shows that credit rating scores responses vary across nation groups. Credit rating scores remain unchanged for most of the Core EU and the Scandinavian nations. By contrast, the PIIGS, the Baltics, the RAMS I and II groups show credit score downgrades. The lag between the credit score downgrades and the crisis transition dates range between 210 -450 days, meaning that downgrades could potentially act as an upcoming crisis indicator. Subsequent downgrades that could warn about the severity of the crisis occur with a higher delay. For example, the PIIGS were downgraded, on average, around 750 days after they entered the crisis which could have, in part, affected the awareness of the severity of the crisis, a fact evidenced by the lack of any meaningful relation between credit rating score changes and the crisis duration and intensity measures. By contrast, for the NMS credit scores are more responsive, ranging between 30 -300 days. The reason for this difference may be due to the fact that NMS were monitored more closely (between 180 -365 days gap between last update of credit rating score and the crisis transition date) than the EU-15. One possible explanation is that new entrants' economies are not a familiar territory for the credit rating agencies. Table 7 , Panel A, Columns II -III show the EU-wide average conditional correlations for the pre-crisis and crisis periods respectively. Columns IV and V report the median and mean changes between the precrisis and post-crisis periods of the two correlation indicators per nation group. Column VI shows the standard deviation of the correlation changes in every group. Column VII lists the significance t-test values for the mean change between the pre-crisis and crisis periods. Table 7 , Panel B reports the same statistics for the intra-EU average conditional correlations. As can be seen from the table, the results are mixed.
Correlation and Contagion Effects
[ Table 7 here] The EU-wide correlations are higher for the EU-15 than the NMS, possibly due to the longer presence of the former nations in the European Union and the Eurozone. The intra-EU correlations show that nations in the Scandinavian group are the most interconnected, while those in the RAMS II group are the least.
During the crisis all the nation groups -but the RAMS II -show evidence of an increase in the EU-wide correlations, verifying financial contagion financial contagion for the respective groups. These results are in line with the studies of (Syllignakis and Kouretas, 2011) , which verify adverse crisis effects and the presence of contagion for the CEE region, and also the vulnerability of emerging markets to crises (Kenourgios and Padhi, 2012) . Intra-EU correlations also increase and indicate the presence of financial contagion within the respective country groups. Comparing the magnitude of the EU-wide and the intra-EU correlation changes is suggestive of a varying degree of contagion across the nation groups. Therefore the crisis has had a differentiated impact upon the EU, a finding that is in line with Gębka and Karoglou (2013) , who take a more globalised perspective.
The evidence shows that the Scandinavian, the PIIGS and the Baltic groups become notionally aligned to financial markets beyond their respective groups, potentially showing evidence of a higher interconnectedness to the EU as evidenced by the relatively larger increase in the EU-wide compared to the intra-EU measure. For the Scandinavian group, the higher alignment with stock markets outside of their group could relate to the important trade linkages they enjoy with other EU nations. For the Baltic group it could be in part attributed to the economic instability in Latvia, the great penetration of foreign banks and the close financial links with the Scandinavian countries (Estonia, 2013) . For the PIIGS group it may be plausibly linked to the EU actions (e.g., bailouts, financial support packages, economic monitoring) with respect to these crisis-hit countries.
By contrast, the opposite is shown for the Core EU and the RAMS groups where the stock markets show evidence of retrenching into national borders. This is likely to be a story of two extremes, where on the one hand the nations belonging to the Core EU group have well-established financial centres, share a great commitment to the -European identity‖ (Eurobarometer, 2013) and act as an economic bellwether for the rest of the EU. On the other hand, for the RAMS I and II groups the explanation may rest with their lesser integration (partly attributed to their recent acceptance) with the EU-15 (i.e., in respect of labour markets, retail markets and financial markets) and their weaker sense of -European identity‖ (Eurobarometer, 2013).
Crisis Intensity and Economic Indicators
In the pre-crisis period, investors were driven by the low-interest rate environment. In pursuit of higher yields they switched from developed to developing markets and, within the EU, from the so-called -core‖ (i.e., EU-15) to the periphery (i.e., NMS). The global financial crisis brought to the surface the risks associated with enhanced rewards. This led investors to rebalance their portfolio positions, shifting back to the perceived safety of the -strong‖ states (i.e., Germany, the Netherlands). Under duress, market participants compared the relative strength of the EU states, and reacted accordingly. In doing so, they gave support to the notion that the intensity of a nation's crisis experience is related to the quality of its economic fundamentals (Bekaert et al., 2014) . As -stronger‖ economies weathered the crisis, others were targeted as the weaker links in the chain.
We consider a Spearman rank correlation measure to analyse the impact of economic indicators on the unified crisis performance (UCP) indicator. Our set of macroeconomic variables includes: i) the current account balance as a percentage of GDP; ii) central government debt as a percentage of GDP; iii) the ratio of total labour costs to real output -reflecting cost competitiveness; iv) the real effective exchange rateas a proxy for competitiveness; v) the percentage of value added to GDP by industrial and manufacturing activities -as a proxy for industrialization; vi) a Eurozone (single currency) dummy. Annual data are sourced from the IMF, the World Bank and OECD for the period of the study. We use the average levels of these measures over the full study period. Table 8 reports the estimated correlation coefficients and diagnostics from our analysis. The results show industrialisation, the Eurozone dummy, current account balance and the real effective exchange rate to be statistically significant with the expected signs. Low levels of current account debt, real effective exchange rate and a higher degree of industrialisation contribute favourably to lessen the impact of crisis. Thus, for example, both Germany and the Czech Republic (i.e., both industry intensive) enter the crisis with lags of three and five months respectively from their respective nation groups. They also had a relative less severe crisis experience than, for example, finance-oriented Luxembourg and debt-ridden Greece. Eurozone members are confirmed to have been more adversely hit by the global financial crisis.
[ Table 8 here]
Conceptual and Empirical Issues
When a period of economic growth comes to an abrupt end, economic policy becomes focused upon moderating the severity of the ensuing downturn. The recession that is experienced across nations may be differentially exacerbated by the extent of contagion, which is by no means homogeneous as evidenced by the measures we deployed in previous sections of this paper. That broad term, contagion, encompasses a variety of inter-related causes and consequences. These include the collapse of a speculative -bubble‖, the negative income multiplier, de-leveraging of bank credit, profit-taking (or damage limitation) in equity markets, a downgrade of credit ratings, rising debt-to GDP ratios and sovereign debt restructuring. Moreover, in applying remedial policy measures, sovereign treasuries and their companion central banks will have different strengths and their respective interventions will be conducted with varying degrees of understanding and expertise. The single euro currency per se may have hindered efficient market adjustments. Where, within the US and the UK, there are inter-regional permanent fiscal transfers these are non-existent within the Eurozone. 28 The cliché is that one size must fit all; which means that although the ECB might deliver a general level of Eurozone prices that is stable, unique structural changes within national economies may require -internal revaluations‖; i.e., individual price and wage realignments. Our analysis engages with that complex detail only with the broadest of brush-strokes, but the relevance upon the crisis experience in the PIIGS is apparent.
In Greece, social welfare and pensions were not funded by tax, so euros were paid out on the basis of a growing sovereign debt at the expense of labour and pension reforms that may have increased the competitiveness of the Greek economy. 29 Euros were used to finance import expenditures and this showed up as increasing Target 2 imbalances for the Bank of Greece. Similar practices were typical of the other PIIGS nations to a varying extent. In parallel, the ECB's posture that all Eurozone-wide sovereign debt bears virtually no risk (as evidenced by its stance on risk capital regulation and as liquidity provider, see Castellacci and Choi, 2005) allowed market participants to presume that cross-border liabilities would be guaranteed, either via government intervention and international bail-out programmes; or indeed that risk differentials had been factored out completely (Sbracia and Zaghini, 2001) . Consequently, financial institutions increased their exposure to the PIIGS, while the ability to contain potential contagious damage was decreasing (Castellacci and Choi, 2015) . It is in the nature of markets that the refinancing difficulties of a single nation cause participants to re-evaluate their perceptions of other nations, and their reactions are the drivers of contagion (Bekaert et al., 2011; Missio and Watzka, 2011) . To the sensitivity of market participants' reactions, catalytic was the role of the Lehman collapse (September 2008) that, economic consequences aside, raptured the belief that one of the largest, triple-AAA accredited financial institutions cannot go bust.
In the EU, the game was set and in 2009 the newly elected Greek government revised upwards the budget deficit to 12.7%, over four times higher than the maximum allowed for Eurozone members, while the European Commission condemns Greece for falsifying its statistics 30 (i.e., Greek statistics scandal).
Market nervousness unveiled amidst these developments with Greece losing the A-grade in credit ratings. By late, 2010 markets realised that fiscal conditions in the PIIGS were much more precarious than had been expected and further credit score downgrades ensued. Other of the PIIGS would follow suit as markets began to speculate on the next weakest link.
As market participants unwounded their positions, they facilitated the contagion spread process. This is particularly evident in the case of the NMS. Relatedly, Arvai et al., (2009) report that in most of the NMS, Austrian, Belgian, German and Italian financial institutions commanded the majority of the banking assets. While the expansion of credit to the private sector was aiding growth, financial stability was undermined (Cottarelli et al., 2003) . NMS nations that were dependent on a single lender were affected later but at a higher intensity compared to countries with more diversified sources of funds (Árvai et al., 2009) . This may be a plausible explanation for countries (e.g., Estonia, Hungary) that entered the crisis later and at a high crisis intensity score.
Conclusion
This paper investigates the impact of the global financial crisis on EU stock markets using an ADCC-GARCH model with a Markov switching component. Using data for the period 2001 to 2011, the work seeks to establish when each of Europe's stock markets entered a crisis regime, how long each market remained in that regime and how severe was the crisis. The current EU Member States are a diverse group with very different equity markets. For example, the markets in the countries that acceded in the last decade are much less developed, both in terms of size and activity, than those in the EU-15. It is therefore pertinent to question whether markets in the two blocs of countries display symmetric responses to such a shock as the global financial crisis. Of particular interest is any evidence of a spread in the pattern of the effects across the EU stock markets. Such evidence would indicate contagion and provide some indication of the degree of equity market integration in Europe.
The results presented in the paper uphold the presence of contagion. In broad terms and as expected, markets in the EU-15 were affected earlier than those in the NMS, a finding which reflects the greater exposure of the older members to world markets. Moreover, the EU-15 experienced shaper falls in financial markets than the NMS, and they also recovered more slowly. Even within the EU-15 nations, differences did emerge where, not surprisingly, the PIIGS countries were most affected by the crisis. The NMS that were frontrunners in the accession process were also hit by the crisis earlier than those that entered into membership negotiations later. Differences also emerged regarding both the severity and the duration of the crisis in these nations. The work also revealed that the nature of the relationships between EU stock markets changed in the aftermath of the crisis with markets in Scandinavia, the PIIGS countries and the leading NMS economies becoming more closely aligned.
While many factors doubtless contribute to explain why EU stock markets displayed differing reactions to the crisis, attention here focussed on a number of key macroeconomic indicators. Results from a simple regression exercise revealed that both a high degree of industrialisation and a low level of government debt served to lessen the impact of the crisis. From a policy perspective, this suggests two lessons. First, it reinforces the EU's desire for Member States to maintain a sound fiscal policy, as detailed in the Stability and Growth Pact. Second, it might make governments in the NMS in particular think twice about allowing manufacturing to decline as the growth of services has been favoured, which has been the case in certain EU-15 nations.
Coudert, V. and Gex, M. (2010) Tables   Table 1. Notes: The table reports coefficients, standard errors and goodness of fit statistics for the multivariate DCC-GARCH and ADCC-GARCH models fitted on the sample. AIC and BIC denote the Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria respectively while LogL denotes the log likelihood. LR Test is the likelihood ratio test between the DCC-GARCH and ADCC-GARCH models. A rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the ADCC-GARCH is a significant improvement over the DCC-GARCH. *** , ** , * : denote significance at the 1, 5, 10% significance levels respectively.  We document evidence of a differentiated crisis experience across all EU members.
 We confirm the presence of financial contagion in five of the six nation groups.
 Not all of EU's stock markets enter the crisis at the same time.
 On average the nations of the EU-15 are affected earlier than the New Member States.
